DOYLC

The term "precision" seems to have changed its meaning over the centuries, which may cause confusion to anyone dealing with the literature of definitions.  It signifies more than one concept, which muddles things up.  Unfortunately, I may be adding to the muddle, as some of my points in this post are from memory, and I will have to rediscover the references for them.  However, I wanted to capture what I now have about precision.  T he etymology of "precision", according to Peirce, means "to cut off at the end" (from "Issues in Pragmatism", The Monist, Vol 15, Oct 1905 pp481-499).  Apparently, it is connected with "curt denials and refusals" - cutting someone off.  Oddly, this seems to have tradionally meant that the more cutting off you did, the greater precision you achieved.  As such, it runs counter to our idea of numerical precision, where the greater the number of decimal places, the greater the precision.  On the traditional view,

The traditional answer to this question is "yes", because classic essential definitions follow the formula Definition = Genus + Specific Difference. However, definitions of concepts in natural science tend to be more like descriptions than classical definitions.  This may be unavoidable, but there is always a danger in a descriptive definition of not mentioning any related concepts.  Such definitions may give the impression of a style in which definitions should be written, and this sometimes carries over into analyst work - so that some analysts tend to write descriptive definitions, even if essential ones could be provided.  And such definitions lack mention of related concepts.     But should a definition always identify related concepts?  I think it should.  I think that practical usage of a definition requires an understanding of the Concept System in which the definition is located.  Without such an understanding, the user runs a risk of not being able to use the defini

Analysts can sometimes create huge problems if they try to produce single definitions for terms within a single semantic community and within a single  universe of discourse.  This may sound crazy, so let me start by giving an example. Not long ago I was in a discussion concerning data quality.  The group leaders decided there was a need to discuss the so-called "dimensions of data quality", e.g. Accuracy, Consistency, Timeliness, and so on.  We started with Consistency.  Each individual in the group offered their view of what Data Consistency was.  Several different definitions were offered.  Eventually, the group took a vote and decided which definition of Data Consistency they preferred.  The alternative definitions were not discussed further, nor recorded.  The individuals who had proposed the unaccepted definitions felt slighted, perhaps even hurt.  And they had a right to - as far as I could tell, the alternative definitions represented valid concepts. What a broken pr

In the sparse literature about definitions, most publications are from Academia.  However, Nordterm 8 Guide to Terminology by Heidi Suonuuti (ISBN 952-9794-14-2) is a very useful and practical booklet from a practicioner community.  Further details can be found at http://www.nordterm.net/info/Publ/PNORDTERM8-en.html . Nordterm describes itself as follows: "Nordterm is an association of organisations and societies in the Nordic countries which are engaged in terminology work, training and research.".  Terminology work, of course, covers much more than definitions, but A Guide to Terminology does contain a fair amount on definitions, and has a very practical focus. Nordterm 8 contains a very useful set of references, particularly about ISO Standards.  It introduces definitions in a section on Concept Analysis, that is also valuable as an overview of ontology - again from a practical perspective. A section dedicated to definitions follows, with systematization in terminology wor

I think that partial definitions exist, and there are practical reasons for being interested in them.  I cannot find any literature about them, and this post is my first attempt at dealing with partial definitions. The only conceptualization of a partial definition that I have figured out in any detail can be summarized by the formula: Partial Definition = Name of Concept System + Type of Relation in Concept System E.g., for "Wristwatch" Definition of "Wristwatch" = "A type of timepiece" Obviously, this parallels the Aristoteialan formula of Definiton = Genus + Specific Difference.  However, I think that Aristotle commits definitions to being only in a Concept System of generic relations (supertype-subtype to our data modeling friends).  Other types of Concept System exist, e.g. partative (part-whole), and associative.  In a partial definition we provide information by locating the concept to be defined within a particular Concept System, giving context to

This topic will require more than one post, because there is more than one definition of "Explanation".  That is, the term "Explanation" signifies more that one concept. The first kind of explanation we will deal with can be defined as: "Bringing a mind to an understanding of a topic". This means that an explanation must be relative to the mind which is to be brought to the intended understanding.  For instance, the way we explain the solar system to an 8-year old child will likely be different to the way we explain the solar system to a college undergraduate.  The explanation offered will depend on prior knowledge, experience, developed intelligence, and probably many other factors.  Differences between defintion and explanation can be summarized as follows: A definition is not intended to be proportional to any mind.  It has to be the best description of a concept that is available. This is is quite unlike explanation, where there will be many explanatio

A definition describes a concept.   A concept has many characteristics.   The process of abstraction occurs when we consider the characteristics of a concept individually (or, at least this is one way in which the term "abstraction" is used).   Very often, the characters considered the most when doing definitions are those which describe the essence of the concept.   Consider, for instance, the traditional Aristotelian formula for a definition: Definition = Genus + Specific Difference In the historical literature about definitions, emphasis was put on the specific difference as being the essential characters of a concept.   This may serve the philosophers' purposes, but it ignores the problem of identification, and the need to consider identifying characteristics in a definition. Suppose I want to define the concept of Exit Row in a plane.   Let's try to do so using Aristotle's method. "A row of seats that provides emergency access to the outside of a plane&q